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Abstract 
Do market-oriented economic reforms result in higher levels of human well-being? 
This paper studies the impact of macro-level institutional and infrastructure reforms 
on the economic, educational and health dimensions of human well-being among 
25 transition economies. We use panel data econometrics based on the LSDVC 
technique to analyse the effects of market-oriented reforms on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), as a measure of human well-being, from 1992 to 2007. 
The results show the complexity of reform impacts in transition countries. They 
show that institutional and economic reforms led to positive economic effect and 
significant impacts on other dimensions of human development. We find some 
positive economic impacts from infrastructure sectors reforms. However, not every 
reforms measure appears to generate positive impacts. Large-scale privatizations 
show negative effects in health and economic outcomes. The overall results show 
the importance of the interaction among different reform measures and the 
combined effect of these on human development. 
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1. Introduction 
Human development is defined as ‘a process of enlarging people’s choices consisting of 
at least three essential components such as long and healthy life, knowledge 
accumulation and resources to maintain a good standard of living’ (UNDP, 1990, p. 
10). Most policymakers and scholars anticipate that overall economic reforms including 
openness to international trade; macroeconomic stabilisation, price liberalisation and 
enforcement of laws, regulation and proper institutions improve human and economic 
development by enlarging capabilities of and choices among individuals.  
 
Past studies have showed a positive overall influence on human well-being and welfare 
(measured by the 'human development index' (HDI)) due to globalization and free 
market systems through a plethora of mechanisms (see Sirgy et al. 2004; Tsai, 2007). 
However, the empirical consequences of high-level market-oriented reforms on human 
well-being remain largely unsettled. This paper proposes an empirical framework for 
assessing the impact of market-oriented institutional and infrastructure reforms on the 
well-being in 'transition countries'.  
 
The transition countries include twenty-nine economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
1
. They provide a rare case study of reforms because 
the end of central planning in the early 1990s meant that many of these countries 
implemented broad market-driven reforms as a part of thorough going economic and 
political changes. The Soviet Union fragmented into 15 independent states in 1991 and 
the new independent states had limited experience of independence and sovereignty. 
Czechoslovakia, which experienced the “velvet revolution” in 1989, separated into the 
independent states of Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Yugoslavia followed a 
similar path with the independence of Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia though 
the independence process in Yugoslavia was plagued by conflict and war (Lukic and 
                                                          
1
 The countries included can be divided into three groups: Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States 
(CEB) comprising Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; 
South-Eastern Europe (SEE) comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, 
Serbia, Romania and Montenegro; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprising Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia (left the CIS in 2009), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Besides these countries, Turkey and Mongolia are 
included in the transition economies as per European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
areas of operation.  
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Lynch, 1996). By 1992, an overwhelming majority of the newly independent states had 
transited to a peaceful and democratic market driven framework for governance. The 
end of central planning paved the way for implementing market-oriented economic 
reforms in the transition countries while allowing them to diverge politically and 
economically from each other (Nepal et al, 2014).  
 
The transition countries that emerged from the fall of communist regimes in the early 
1990s experienced sharp economic decline as the output of the state sector shrank while 
the private sector was not developed enough to quickly close the output-gap (Fan and 
Fan, 1998). Dramatic economic and social issues resembling those in the central 
planning models in the 1980s marked the early transition process. Countries such as 
Poland in Eastern Europe and Russia adopted a radical approach or “shock therapy” to 
fully and quickly open their economies (Murrell, 1993). Elsewhere, reforms were 
slower as they were constantly relayed and interrupted owing to political impediments 
and domestic conflicts such as in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For 
example, Hungary and Slovakia opted for a slow reform pace while reforms in Georgia 
and Tajikistan were affected by political turmoil and civil wars. “Market 
fundamentalists” prescribed quick and broad reforms for countries affected by crisis, 
while the “gradualists” argued that the timing and sequencing of reforms was crucial to 
make the reforms work (Staehr, 2005). This led to a varied range of experiences with 
economic reforms with diverse outcomes.  
 
The complex effects engendered in the transition towards a market economy from 
central planning necessitate examining the socio-economic aspects that span well-
beyond economic growth although examining the reform impacts on economic growth 
can serve as a starting point. Furthermore, the credibility of the transition process was 
enhanced by the adoption of the specific policy prescriptions under the Washington 
Consensus and eventually favoured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. Did the free market policy prescriptions contribute to an overall 
improvement in human development in the aftermath of more than two decades of 
reforms in the transition countries? Our aim is to explore this question and fill an 
important gap in the reform literature and is broader than the empirical literature 
focused on conventional growth analysis. 
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We use a dynamic panel data model based on the unique and novel bias corrected fixed 
effect analysis that accounts for the sample size and the corresponding bias in the 
estimates. We also allow for the interaction effect of a combination of different reform 
measures since market-oriented economic reforms include a range of measures and their 
impacts on human well-being is, therefore, likely to be multi-faceted. The results show 
that institutional reforms drove the improvements in human well-being in the transition 
countries. The interaction of reforms also point to a diverse set of impacts on human 
development implying the importance of appropriate packaging of reforms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
constituents of the HDI. Section 3 provides a theoretical exposition based on a detailed 
literature review and sets a conceptual framework for the formation of hypotheses. The 
hypotheses are presented in Section 4. The data and advanced panel data econometric 
methodology is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results. The results are 
further discussed with relevant policy implications in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. The Human Development Index (HDI) 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index based on three distinct 
indicators: (i) longevity, (ii) educational attainment and (iii) standard of living (UNDP, 
1999)
2
. The underlying conceptual framework of the HDI stems from the capabilities 
and functioning approach where quality of life is translated into the capability to 
function in society, in terms of a set of beings and doings (Sen, 1989). Hence, the HDI 
had the explicit purpose "to shift the focus of development economics from national 
income accounting to people centred policies"(ulHaq, 1996). 
 
The first Human Development Report (HDR) and the first HDI were developed in 
response to the “excessive preoccupation with GNP growth and national income 
accounts” that was based on a ‘means’ estimate and not in the ‘ends’ of well-being of 
the population (UNDP, 1990, p.9). It provided a tractable approach for analysis even if 
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 An explanation on how the HDI is calculated is presented in Appendix A.2. 
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the procedure was subject to criticism and raised several concerns among researchers
3
. 
For example, the HDI indicators do not reflect factors such as the rule of law and 
political freedom. However, this is the only feasible approach to overcoming the 
problem of measuring the capabilities framework of human development, as the set of 
human functioning is by definition almost unobservable (Ranis, 2004). Hence, the HDI, 
even as a rough proxy, can serve as a diagnostic tool for opportunities in a society and 
implies a much richer and diverse set of human aspects than just income.  
 
According to the calculation method used until 2011, the three indicators are scaled 
from 0 to 1 and have equal weights on the formulaic derivation of the HDI. A 
combination of these reflects different aspects of overall human well-being that go 
beyond a simple measure of economic welfare. Since 2011, the calculation formula of 
the HDI has changed to a multiplicative index. However, the new and old HDI indexes 
have an extremely high correlation in transition economies and the focus of the analysis 
in this paper is mostly on the individual components of the index. 
 
In the socialist countries, private initiative was limited or nearly non-existent in general 
and education and health services were generally provided for free, although there were 
critics about their quality, such as the lack of medical items, unequal distribution of 
consumer durables and wealth and a rigid educational system with access restricted to 
higher education. Nonetheless, literacy levels were close to 100% before the transition 
process (Murrell, 1991). There was also a functioning social security system with 
variable levels of protection across countries with a flat distribution of social transfers
4
. 
However, the fact that the wage distribution was quite flat masked the extreme 
differences in income between socialist and capitalist countries throughout history 
(Matthews, 1986). Thus, the transition economies had some distinctive characteristics at 
the start of the process: low levels of income, but good standards of access to education 
and health, due to “previous investments made in social dimensions by previous 
regimes” (Tridico, 2007, p.577). This translates to more capabilities, which were mostly 
constrained by a lack of social and political freedom. 
 
                                                          
3
 For a complete review of critiques of the HDI, see Kovacevic (2010). 
4
 See Milanovic (1998) for a discussion of income, poverty and social transfers in communist regimes. 
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3. The Literature and evidence 
Previous studies have not directly examined the impact of market-based reforms on the 
overall level of human well-being in the transition countries thus leaving a major gap in 
the literature. However, earlier studies have analysed the effectiveness of the reforms on 
individual dimensions (economic growth, education outcomes and healthcare) of the 
HDI providing some guidance to our research. The impacts of reforms on economic 
growth in transition economies have been studied extensively. Fischer et al. (1996) 
pioneered by using transition indicators as cumulative indexes and found a positive 
relationship between these and economic growth between 1992 and 1994. Havrylyshyn 
(2001) conducted an extensive survey on the existing literature after the effort of 
Fischer et al. (1996) about economic growth in transition economies, finding a wide 
consensus about the determinants of growth. Similarly, Black et al. (2000) attributed the 
shrink in national output to the flaws in the privatization efforts in the transition 
countries.  
 
Most of the above studies have used the transition indicators from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as the primary source of data. However, 
Raimbaev (2011) used the governance indicators from the World Bank and found a 
crucial role for governance in economic growth. Likewise, most studies using the 
reform indices of the EBRD focussed on institutional indices and their performance 
instead of a combined analysis or interactions of economic and infrastructure reforms. 
Aghion and Schankerman (1999) showed that investment in physical and institutional 
infrastructure, besides reducing direct costs, allows lower transaction costs and a higher 
level of competition, through indirect effects or “transition impacts”. De Macedo and 
Martins (2008) found the interaction between governance and infrastructure reforms to 
increase efficiency of investments while the interaction among the liberalization and 
financial reforms enhanced the profitability of investments. 
 
Likewise, the transition process had important implications in the life of the citizens of 
the ex-USSR as economic and political changes were triggered. For example, factors 
crucial to human development such as the nature of labour relationships and the role of 
women in society changed with the transition to market economy. Tridico (2007) 
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studied the relationship between human development and economic growth during 
transition and concluded that investing in human development is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic growth. Tridico argued that institutions and 
institutional policies are crucial for a “development process” in the context of transition 
economies. Tridico (2007) also notes that death rates have risen and life expectancy 
have declined, especially in the Baltic States and the CIS, while privatisation often 
generated second class health systems, and that after 1989 public spending in education 
fell as a consequence of a decrease in GDP
5
.  
 
However, in planned economies wages did not clearly reflect the level of education and 
returns to schooling were low. Therefore, moving to a market economy could have 
increased returns to schooling. This claim is often studied, with mixed results. Flabbi et 
al. (2007) found weak evidence of rising returns to education, except in Russia and 
Hungary where the rise was noticeable. This claim is not consensual as it can be argued 
that economic reforms created the conditions for better educational attainment (through 
growth and accessibility improvements), even if spending on education was reduced 
and the quality of the system decreased. It is difficult to measure the latter, and clearly 
being enrolled in a school is not the same as acquiring more capabilities. However, 
enrolment is easily measurable and is valuable information by itself. Other issues tackle 
the educational system in transition: the staff had been trained to teach in the old 
framework of central planning where skills were not developed or encouraged, while 
the required skills in a market economy are different (Berryman, 2000). As the system 
changed, workers trained under the central planning model were not qualified to work in 
a market economy. This implies that returns to education can be much higher for those 
who studied in the transition period.  
 
The literature suggests that large scale privatizations led to the deterioration of health 
conditions. King et al. (2009) attributed the increase in mortality in ex-communist 
countries to mass privatizations leading to higher alcohol-related deaths, suicides and 
cardiac problems. These factors had a negative impact on life expectancy. The rapid 
changes in the economy and society generated stress with the above mentioned 
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 Data on public expenditure is scarce for transition economies, especially for education. The gap between 
spending and efficiency is also a reason why spending amounts should not be taken into account. 
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consequences. Tompson (2007) also argues that the problems with the Russian 
healthcare system, which underwent mass privatization, were not caused directly by the 
state of the economic system but were due to factors such as alcohol consumption and 
traffic accidents. These arguments are complemented by the findings in Tridico (2007, 
p.578) who argued, “people with low income and losers of the transition towards 
‘marketization’ cannot afford the more expensive and more advanced private health 
care services”. Nonetheless, it is not realistic to assume that all aspects and components 
of HDI such as education and health can be objectively and explicitly quantified and 
modelled. Therefore, there is a need for more simplified approaches to be adopted as 
shown in Section 5 of the present paper. 
 
The perspectives of the public in transition economies about the transition process have 
also been the subject of research. Analysis of data from the Life in Transition Surveys I 
(EBRD, 2007) and II (EBRD, 2011) provided useful insight about the experiences of 
citizens, the way they adjusted their behaviour, how they see their institutions and their 
opinions on education, health, social issues and corruption. Findings from the first 
survey, conducted towards the end of the period of study in this paper, point to mixed 
feelings and nostalgia as only 30% of households believe they live better now than in 
1989. Many perceive more investments in health and education as a priority, while a 
notion of widespread corruption is present, with consequences most visible in irregular 
payments in public health systems. General trust in society has decreased and people 
clearly answer that others could be trusted more in 1989 than they do now.  
 
This study merges these branches of literature and aims to provide empirical evidence 
on whether market-oriented economic reforms positively affected improvements in 
people well-being, measured by Human Development Index which is a composite index 
that accounts for income, education and health. The findings of this study are especially 
relevant from a policymaking perspective as these centrally planned regimes (including 
the USSR) presided over 17% of the world’s area and 9% of the world’s population 
where state employment accounted for 90% of the labour force in 1988 (Milanovic, 
1998). Likewise, universal education and health were widely available in these 
countries unlike other economies with similar levels of income although the quality of 
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public services was often ignored in order to achieve quantitative target (Federal 
Research Division, 1991). 
 
4. Hypotheses and Conceptual Framework 
We examine the effects of economy-wide reforms by considering the interaction 
between reforms and their effect on the HDI as a whole as well as on the individual 
components of the Index. These components followed different patterns as reforms 
triggered ambiguous impacts across the transition countries. While education and health 
suffered from under-investment after the fall of the centrally planned economies, these 
events also caused a sharp decline in GDP (Tridico, 2007). Thus, the transition 
economies adopted different strategies considering these initial conditions in the early 
1990s. This led to different paces for implementation of reforms and different packages 
of reforms, which might have been simply institutional or accompanied by advances in 
infrastructure and the associated regulation framework. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
the reforms and economic and social outcomes over the transition period
6
. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the HDI and its components rose steadily since 1995 despite a sharp 
decline in the GDP index and a decrease in life expectancy in the early years of the 
reforms. This is also likely to reflect the presence of functioning institutional 
frameworks that were already in place, and the indexes rose during the following years, 
as institutions adopt the characteristics of those of a market economy, though this needs 
to be examined. Infrastructure sector reform and changes could also be important, 
though perhaps to a lesser extent than institutional advances, as the latter fundamentally 
changed the structure of the economy and its activities.  
Countries with modest or low reform efforts were struggling economically. Generally, 
other regions such as the CIS or Asian countries did not follow the “shock therapy” 
approach adopted in countries like Poland and Russia, where slower approaches were 
adopted. Differences in their growth patterns were clear in early periods of transition, 
                                                          
6
 The data for figures one to five includes a set of 25 transition economies explored further in the paper. 
We exclude Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. The explanations are provided in section 5. 
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where the blocks that applied quicker reforms came out of recession earlier and 
achieved consistent growth throughout the 1990s (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of reform indices and Human Development Index (1992-2007)
7
 
Source: EBRD (left) and World Bank/UNDP/UNESCO (right) 
 
 
Figure 2. Real GDP growth in economic blocks (1990-2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2002 
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 LEI, EI, GDP and HDI refer to Life Expectancy Index, Education Index, GDP Index and Human 
Development Index respectively, with data from the UNDP. 
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Thus, the following two hypotheses are formulated as a link between reforms and 
changes in dimensions of human development based on the arguments of market 
fundamentalists and policy linkages between infrastructure and institutional reforms 
respectively. The market proponents argue for quick reforms in all fronts. This implied 
that the level and quality of institutional and infrastructural endowments changes across 
the transition countries as quickly as possible post-reforms. Likewise, policy linkages 
between infrastructure and institutional reforms coupled with the gains from combining 
both types of policies can impact different dimensions of human development though to 
differing extent. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
“Economic reforms was beneficial for all dimensions of human development as the 
economy progressed into a market economy.'' 
 
Hypothesis 2 
“Infrastructure sector reforms contributed to human development.” 
 
However, other issues arise when the possibility of negative impact of reforms are 
considered. In many transition economies, mass privatizations were carried out quickly 
without appropriate institutional and legal frameworks (Stiglitz, 1999; Nepal and 
Jamasb, 2014). Hence, it is possible that the privatisation process created negative 
effects, at least in the short run. The stress caused by sudden social and economic 
changes could lead to increased health risks. This implies that large-scale privatizations 
should have a negative effect on life expectancy, even if they have different impacts on 
other dimensions of human development.  
 
A combination of large-scale privatizations with insufficient governance reforms is 
expected to worsen the effect. Figure 3 shows that life expectancy was declining as the 
privatization process was advancing. It then recovered later to pre-transition values in 
the late 1990s across the transition countries indicating a possible causality link between 
life expectancy and implementation of reforms. This in turn leads us to formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
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Figure 3. Evolution of large scale privatizations and life expectancy (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD/World Bank. Life Expectancy Index on left hand side axis and  
Large Scale Privatizations on right side axis. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
“Large scale privatizations caused adverse effects on life expectancy and degraded life 
conditions by creating “second class” health systems, where the poor did not have 
access to appropriate healthcare”. 
 
People in transition economies see public health systems as the public service where 
“irregular” payments are necessary in over 20% of cases, with the associated 
perspective that public systems deteriorated without a compensating improvement in 
private provision of such a service, according to data from the Life in Transition Survey 
(EBRD, 2007). The privatization efforts were also criticized due to poor planning and 
selling processes and occurred under the 'velvet gloves' such as widespread corruption, 
lack of rules and transparency and lack of planning of the process (Stiglitz, 1999). This 
also largely affected the privatization of infrastructure sectors and utilities such as 
electricity and telecom. Thus, it is likely that the mass privatizations could have had a 
negative effect on GDP.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the privatization efforts were carried out quickly, faster than the 
average of all other reforms, while countries were struggling with sharp falls in GDP. 
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This might imply policy failure due to lack of reform complementarity. As countries 
were selling assets as a matter of urgency to tackle budget and debt problems, it can be 
argued that the process was not timed and prepared properly. Therefore, we formulate 
our fourth hypothesis. 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of GDP, large scale privatizations and governance (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD / World Bank. GDP Index in right hand side axis  
and other variables on the left hand side axis. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
“Large scale privatizations had a negative effect on the GDP due to the “dirty 
privatization” phenomenon” as explained by Black et al. (2000). 
 
The impact of reforms in education is also an important issue in the context of transition 
countries. The centrally planned regimes kept returns to education low by applying a 
wage grid (Munich et al., 2000), which implies that transition towards a market 
economy should increase such returns. Increasing returns to education could have an 
impact on enrolment rations by creating further incentive to pursue higher levels of 
education and achieve a better job with a high wage. 
 
Figure 5 shows the behaviour of institutional advances and the education index which 
involves school enrolment and literacy ratios. Since literacy was already very high 
before transition (close to 100% in most countries), changes in this index are essentially 
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explained by changes in enrolment ratios. Thus, the previously exposed argument leads 
us to formulate our fifth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. 
''The overall reform effort should bring positive effects to enrolment in higher levels of 
education as returns to higher education increase, affecting the Education Index 
positively''. 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of institutions and the Education Index (1992-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD/UNDP/UNESCO.  
Average Institutional Index (left axis) and Education Index (right axis). 
 
5. Data and Methodology 
In order to examine the impacts of market-based structural reforms on the HDI in the 
transition countries we use the HDI data available from UNDP as dependent variables 
from 1992 to 2007. UNDP has been publishing Human Development Reports with HDI 
scores for many countries since 1990. Ensuring data compatibility is important and the 
Human Development Report Office advises against constructing trend analyses based 
on data from different editions (UNDP, 2005, p.212). Therefore, we have undertaken an 
extensive rebuild of the HDI data in order to ensure consistency in the dataset across all 
the years. 
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Table 1: Reforms and effects in HDI components 
 GDP EI LEI 
 + - + - + - 
Large Scale 
Privatizations 
Improves 
efficiency and 
stimulates 
investment 
“Dirty 
privatization” 
without 
governance 
reforms  
Market 
economy 
increases 
returns to 
education 
 
 
Positive 
effects of 
growth and 
infra-
structure 
“Shock” 
therapy 
causes social 
problems in 
short-run 
(e.g. 
unemployme
nt, school 
dropouts) 
Can create 
more efficient 
health services 
“Second class” 
health systems 
Degradation of 
life conditions / 
Quick social 
changes 
Small Scale 
Privatizations 
New firms 
   
More 
competition 
Governance 
Reforms 
Better 
regulation 
 
Improves 
quality and 
management 
of services 
 
“Smarter” 
investments 
Liberalization 
Reforms 
Reduces price 
distortions 
Short-run 
negative effects 
of “shock 
therapy” 
 
“Shock therapy” 
causes social 
problems (e.g. 
unemployment, 
higher alcohol 
consumption, 
etc.) 
Financial 
Reforms 
Capital 
markets No governance 
reforms imply 
inadequate 
bankruptcy and 
lending 
procedures 
Macro-
economic 
stabilization 
avoids 
economic 
problems 
causing social 
problems 
Easier credit 
Macro-
economic 
stabilization 
Electric/Water 
Infrastructure 
Reforms 
Higher 
investment 
profitability 
 
Possible 
negative effects 
from lack of 
institutions 
 
Improves 
living 
conditions if 
the starting 
infrastructure 
was very poor 
 
Telecommunic
ation/Road 
Infrastructure 
Reforms 
Investment 
profitability Possible 
negative effects 
from lack of 
institutions 
Makes 
education 
services 
more 
accessible 
 
Makes health 
services more 
accessible 
 
Tears down 
distance 
barriers 
Source: Authors own collection 
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The new HDI data were constructed based on the methodology introduced by the 1999 
Human Development Report although the UNDP changed the HDI methodology since 
2010. The change included using the Gross National Income (GNI) instead of GDP and 
measures of years of schooling for the Education Index which may lead to a loss of 
many observations due to lack of data on those new variables. We constructed the 
income index based on per capita GPD
8
 (with 2005 constant PPP$ values) and the life 
expectancy index based on life expectancy at birth. As mentioned above, the new 
method for HDI calculation from the individual components introduced in 2011 is not 
used. That measure has a correlation of 0.998 with those calculated for this paper, and 
the focus of the analysis is not on combined HDI itself. Changing the way the index is 
calculated would have little or no impact in results. 
 
The lack of a consistent single dataset for the education index implied that the index 
was retrieved from the Human Development Reports for 1992-1995 and 1997-2007. 
The value for the year 1996 was based on average of 1995 and 1997 index values. The 
limited UNESCO data for education shows a reasonable approximation of the data 
behaviour. We use the same values from the first available year for two countries that 
started to appear on the reports after 1992 to avoid the problems of missing data
9
. We 
use the UNESCO data on education to construct an Education Index for Mongolia and 
Uzbekistan due to inconsistencies and unreasonable index jumps between reports
10
. 
This implies that the HDI retrieved for each country in a given year is not directly 
comparable to the values in the UNDP reports. However, this was necessary to improve 
the quality of data and make them suitable for the purpose of this study. 
 
The data for the independent variables were obtained from the transition indicators 
scores published by the EBRD. The indicators are bounded between 1 and 4+ and are 
mainly separated in two main sections: institutional reforms and infrastructure reforms. 
                                                          
8
 It is common to take logarithms of GDP to proceed with analysis. However, the GDP index bounded 
between 0 and 1 already includes a form of logarithmic income discounting. 
9
 This specific issue affects Croatia and Macedonia in 1992 and 1993 (affecting a residual 2% share of the 
dataset). Limited UNESCO data for 1993 does not lead us to reject the assumption of constancy. 
10
 Annual Gross enrolment ratios for all levels combined (except pre-primary) are combined with limited 
data for literacy ratios (that are mostly constant through time) from the UNESCO database according to 
the Education Index formula to replicate it. This is done for Uzbekistan from 1999 onwards and for the 
whole sample period for Mongolia. 
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A score of 1 implies the lack of appropriate institutions and framework to manage the 
economy with a considerable distance from a market economy. A score of 4+ implies 
the same standards and performance as an advanced, industrialized economy, with fully 
working institutions and regulated/decentralised infrastructure networks
11
. The EBRD 
indexes have been subject to criticism and alternatives exist. Campos and Horvath 
(2012) point to several issues with EBRD indicators, such as a lack of information on 
which variables are included in the indexes and how they are aggregated, a potential and 
unclear mix of policy inputs and outcomes, indexes changing without changes in the 
underlying data and the definition of a reference point of reforms against a scenario of a 
“well-functioning market economy” which might be ill-defined. 
 
The authors, instead, develop a new reform measure for 25 transition economies 
between 1989 and 2001 to address the issues with EBRD and World Bank reform 
indicators. An index is defined with additional clarity and aggregation of variables as in 
Lora (1997), making the reference point the maximum in-sample point. One could 
consider this to be a possibility for an alternative measure, but the added value of this 
approach is not clear for two reasons. First, even if the clarity of these measures is less 
debatable than for the EBRD indexes, and data points that correlations between the 
suggested measures and EBRD indexes decreases when the comparison goes from an 
input and outcome index to an input-only index, the lack of correlation between indexes 
is not as serious in EBRD indexes as in the World Bank indexes for the time frames 
considered in Campos and Horvath (2012), being always above 0.5.  
 
The EBRD indexes show a lower degree of reform reversals. However, due to the 
reference point being in-sample, large changes in indexes can happen with changes in 
sample size given the way the indexes of Campos and Horvath (2012) are calculated. 
The use of the EBRD indexes can avoid this problem. This also means that if a country 
moves forward pushing the “frontier” of reforms while others stay the same, the index 
will exaggerate the index. The choice of EBRD measures is also justifiable because of 
the extensive time frame which allows for inference in a large balanced panel coupled 
with the indexes being set on common objectives, reference point and common scale 
                                                          
11
 There is a railway infrastructure reform index, which is not included in our analysis due to lack of data. 
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and that the indexes can be quality-weighted allowing to adjust for the possibility even 
when the national data is manipulated to influence future decisions.
12
 Table 2 lists the 
dependent and independent variables used in this study. 
 
 
Table 2: Dependent and independent variables and their sources 
Variable Components Source 
Human Development 
Index (HDI) 
 
 
Life Expectancy Index – LEI 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
GDP Index – GDP 
Education Index – EI 
UNDP Human Development 
Reports / own calculations 
using UNESCO data 
LSP Large Scale Privatization 
EBRD 
 
SSP Small Scale Privatization 
ER 
Enterprise Restructuring 
CP Competition Policy 
TDF Trade and Forex System 
PL Price Liberalization 
BANKLIB 
Banking Reforms and Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
SECFIN 
Securities Markets and Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions 
Infrastructure  
Reform Indexes 
Telecommunications (TELREF) 
Electric Power (ELECREF) 
Roads (ROADREF) 
Water and Water Waste 
(WATEREF) 
Source: Authors own collection 
 
                                                          
12
 The EBRD now releases sectoral transition scores in their Transition Reports, which give further 
insight about progress of reforms, but that data is not available before 2010. 
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The dataset used is, therefore, a balanced panel where the number of cross-sections 
(number of countries) is 25 (N=25) for the key reform time period between 1992 and 
2007 (T=16), with a total of 400 observations. The countries in the sample are Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. We focus on the crucial period of the transition period starting in 1992 (due 
to data availability) up to the point where the world crisis could lead to confusion in the 
identification of the relationship between reform levels and their results, possibly 
leading to incorrect inference (this is related to the issue of common shocks). Besides 
that, the first years of the transition period can be seen as the most important as it has 
been more than twenty years since the fall of the Soviet Union. 
 
Table 3 presents the properties of the data used in this study. Most of the variability in 
the HDI originates from changes in income. This is expected because life expectancy 
and education levels tend to be fairly persistent. The Education Index is high across the 
transition economies due to the priority given to the educational system in these 
centrally planned economies. However, both Education Index and Life Expectancy 
Index experience some variation between and within countries, due to noticeable 
changes, due to school attainment levels and life expectancy respectively. In Education, 
Albania experienced a change of more than 10% between 1993 and 2002 alone, and 
other examples of noticeable variation are present, such as Belarus, Slovenia and 
Bulgaria. The within standard deviation is almost as large as the between standard 
deviation for this index (0.024 and 0.028 respectively).  
 
For the Life Expectancy Index, within and between standard deviations are 0.021 and 
0.057 respectively, which also implies noticeable variation in both ways. Most of the 
variation in the GDP index is between countries (0.132), with the within variation being 
just slightly higher than for other indexes (0.041). This shows that the within variation 
of the three indices is not very different and most of the differences in variation can be 
attributed to between variations. The correlation between human development 
dimensions such as the correlation between GDP and the HDI is high and the 
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correlation of the Education Index with other dimensions or reforms is generally low. 
All variables appear to be stationary, thus avoiding the pitfalls of spurious regression 
results. We infer from the descriptive statistics that multicolinearilty might lead to 
confusing inference justifying the use of a dimension reduction method in our 
secondary analysis
13
.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Within 
Std. Dev 
Between 
Std. Dev 
Min Max 
HDI 0.769 0.066 0.025 0.062 0.624 0.931 
GDP 0.662 0.136 0.041 0.132 0.357 0.930 
EI 0.904 0.037 0.024 0.029 0.760 0.980 
LEI 0.740 0.060 0.021 0.058 0.597 0.893 
LSP 2.683 0.913 0.627 0.677 1 4 
SSP 3.472 0.904 0.633 0.659 1 4.33 
ER 2.122 0.719 0.403 0.607 1 3.67 
PL 3.83 0.625 0.408 0.483 1 4.33 
TDF 3.459 1.103 0.655 0.905 1 4.33 
COMPOL 2.057 0.621 0.407 0.477 1 3.67 
BANKLIB 2.370 0.872 0.530 0.705 1 4 
SECFIN 2.018 0.732 0.458 0.582 1 4 
ELECREF 2.273 0.923 0.688 0.628 1 4 
WATEREF 1.931 0.906 0.573 0.715 1 4 
ROADREF 1.939 0.708 0.416 0.583 1 3.67 
TELREF 2.271 0.950 0.700 0.655 1 4 
Source: Authors own collection 
 
However, the relationship between human development and reforms is complex. This is 
because the existing level of human development can depend on country-specific 
unobserved characteristics (e.g. culture, socio-economic factors and political systems) 
as well as the past levels of human development. The complexity justifies the need for a 
dynamic model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed effects and Random 
effects panel data models can account for unobserved heterogeneity. Although it is 
common to use a Hausman test to find the most adequate method, it is likely that 
                                                          
13
 Results of multi-collinearity tests are present in Table A.2. Allison (1999) points that a VIF value above 
2.5 is problematic, although different authors give different rules of thumb. Belsley (1980) points that a 
condition index above 30% is a serious problem. 
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reforms are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity that is fixed over time (Nepal 
and Jamasb, 2014). This violates the assumption of no correlation between the 
composite error term and the explanatory variables of the Random Effects model, 
justifying the use of a Fixed Effects model. The use of other policy evaluation 
techniques, such as a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimator is not feasible in this 
context, due to the lack of a control group with similar starting characteristics to the 
other group, the existence of continuous and multiple potential treatments, among other 
complicating factors. In such a complicated setting, and if the exogeneity assumption 
holds, the use of Fixed Effects is a standard method in the literature of conducting 
inference. 
 
Thus, we use a dynamic panel data framework. However, when the time dimension (T) 
and the number of countries in the sample (N) are both small, the Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) estimator is not consistent for a finite T. Bruno (2005) developed a 
bias-corrected LSDV estimator (hereafter called LSDVC), under the conditions of 
having the error term as an unobserved white noise disturbance and having a strictly 
exogenous selection rule (this assumption must also hold in standard Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects models). In Monte Carlo experiments, the study confirms that LSDVC 
outperforms competing estimators. Standard errors are retrieved through a 
bootstrapping method with 100 repetitions. A second order bias approximation was 
performed using the Blundell-Bond estimator as a consistent estimator for the bias 
correction procedure
14
. This implies that reforms are uncorrelated with past, present and 
future shocks. Likewise, the assumption is stronger than the classic weak exogeneity 
assumption on growth regression analysis but allows for more precise estimations in a 
small-sample framework.  
 
Alternative estimation methods such as GMM allow relaxation of such strict 
assumptions. However, working on dynamic panels in a small sample framework has 
some implications for those alternatives. Kurennoy (2015) shows that in the presence of 
endogenous regressors, both LSDVC and GMM have poor performance, but that as the 
                                                          
14
 Arellano-Bond and Anderson-Hsiao estimators can also perform this task. However, results are very 
similar between estimators, as Bruno (2005) points in Monte-Carlo studies, therefore only the results 
using Blundell-Bond is presented. 
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degree of endogeneity goes towards zero LSDVC performs better. Flannery et al. (2013) 
also show that LSDVC is the most accurate estimator across a range of data limitations 
in a list of eight tested estimators, and that in the presence of endogeneity, the regressors 
that are exogenous are still estimated correctly. In cases of a large coefficient of the lag 
of the dependent variable, LSDVC is a particularly competitive choice against other 
estimators, even under some degree of endogeneity. This highlights the LSDVC 
estimator as the preferred method for this analysis. The testing procedures broadly 
support the hypothesis of exogeneity on the assumption that policymakers ultimately 
decide which reforms to implement (see Berg et al., 1999)
15
. This justifies the use of 
LSDVC even further. 
 
Another possible issue with the estimation procedure is the presence of cross-section 
dependence across the economic, educational and health among the transition 
economies. There can be bias in estimates under the presence of such a problem in 
dynamic panels with fixed-effects (Phillips and Sul, 2007). Hence, we test for cross-
section dependence using the Cross-section Dependence (CD) test, which has good 
power in small samples (Pesaran, 2004). The null of cross-section independence is not 
rejected for any of the regressions at 1% significance level, giving no clear evidence of 
the presence of such an issue in our data (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). Given that the 
exogeneity assumption holds and there is no evidence of cross-section dependence, we 
validate LSDVC as the preferred method for estimation. 
 
The tests are carried out using two models. First, a basic model without reform 
interactions, which allows identification of the main reforms to human development and 
its components, but this is potentially exposed to the multicolinearity problem. 
However, reform interaction is an important issue and should be approached in such a 
way that treats the above mentioned problems. Thus, as a second approach, a Treelet 
transform of the data (Lee et al., 2008) is applied in order to generate “reform clusters”. 
The Treelet transform is a dimension reduction technique that reflects the internal 
structure of data and is robust to noise, generating components that are sparse, 
                                                          
15
 A test for strict exogeneity is discussed in Wooldridge (2002, pp.284-285). Leads of regressors are 
added to the original regressions and a joint test of their significant is conducted. Failure to reject the null 
implies strict exogeneity holds.  
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something crucial for interpretation purposes. It also has superior performance to other 
methods in the case of very high dimensionality, but in this case is mostly used for the 
simplicity of its output to use in regressions.  
 
While this is an unsupervised dimension reduction technique
16
, the resulting 
components have two major advantages. First, components that involve more than one 
variable have an economic interpretation related to the transition context. Second, 
components that result from only one variable will not be affected by multicolinearity in 
estimations, providing more precise inference about these variables individually. This is 
particularly useful for large-scale privatizations, as part of the hypothesis testing 
process, and variables where significance was occasionally a borderline case (e.g., 
COMPOL). Those components or reform clusters are then used as regressors to gain 
insight into the significance of reform packages. This allows us to assess the 
significance of interaction terms between reforms without multicolinearity. Equation 1 
represents the chosen specification: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (1) 
 
where 𝛾 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, 𝛽 is the vector of 
coefficients of the explanatory variables and 𝜑𝑖 is a set of fixed effects. Although Staehr 
(2005) uses a linear time trend and Falcetti et al. (2006) use a non-linear trend capturing 
patterns across countries, annual time dummies are also included to capture non-
linearities more appropriately. The inclusion of contemporary reforms instead of lagged 
ones does not significantly change the results
17
.  
 
Two models are tested where Model (1) has X𝑡 as the set of individual reforms (the 
EBRD indicators with the mentioned aggregation) and Model (2) has X𝑡 as the set of 
Components of the Treelet method as a representation of reform packages. 
                                                          
16
 Besides Treelet, other unsupervised methods like Principal Component Analysis (PCA) lead to 
interpretation problems as each basis vector is a linear combination of all variables. In theory, supervised 
dimension reduction methods are superior. The Sliced Inverse Regression (SIR) method (Li, 1991) was 
attempted but the issues with interpretation did not greatly improve so we follow an unsupervised method 
that provides more intuition for this specific dataset. Sparse PCA (SPCA) could be an equivalent method 
of similar performance to achieve similar goals, but not as readily available on software packages. 
17
 Staehr (2005) points that the EBRD indexes are scored in the middle of the year, which already implies 
some distance in time to the determination of the dependent variables. 
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6. Results 
This section presents the results specified by the two models described to assess both 
individual reform impact (with results possibly affected by multicolinearity), with 
reform packages and with the inclusion of interaction terms to account for relationships 
between reform packages. The first model accounts for the effects of reforms “on their 
own”. The second model aims to assess which reform packages have been important for 
the HDI outcomes by using a method of dimension reduction, followed by the addition 
of interaction terms.  
Table 4 presents the estimations for Model (1) and Tables 6 and 7 present component 
weights and regressions using those weights respectively. The lagged dependent 
variable is significant in all estimations as expected, showing the persistence of such 
economic and social outcomes. Standard errors are reported in brackets. It is common to 
use LSDVC theoretically assuming strict exogeneity of the used variables. However, in 
many cases, the assumption is not tested. Staehr (2005) stated, in the context of growth 
analysis, that “the marginal effect of reforms on growth is broadly similar whether or 
not one seeks to correct for the endogeneity bias” (pp.182). In this case, at 5% 
significance level, it should be noted that the exogeneity assumption holds, which is 
important for the validity of the LSDVC results. 
The year dummies are jointly significant in all cases, as they capture common events 
and shocks that are not explained by past behaviour or reform variables, allowing for 
unbiased estimation of the other explanatory variables’ coefficients. Figure 6 shows a 
plot of year dummies. While the year dummy coefficients for EI and LEI are closely 
centred on zero with some exceptions, GDP coefficients have a clear trend throughout 
the sample period. The behaviour for EI and LEI year dummies is more stable and 
captures some variation in the indexes not explained by reforms or past indexes, but not 
with a clear trend. The clearer trend on GDP could be explained by the fact that some 
part of the economic recovery up to 2007 is not explained by the reform variables or 
past GDP values, which is somewhat an expected result as there might be other 
influencing factors. Failing to account for the effect of these year dummies would force 
the other coefficients to absorb their effects, leading to biased estimates. It can be seen 
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that as the HDI is an average of the other three measures, the HDI year dummy 
coefficients lie between GDP and the other two. This highlights further the need to 
disaggregate the analysis into three different indexes. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression results for Model (1) 
 HDI EI LEI GDP 
Dep.Var (-1) 
0.9422 
(0.0286)*** 
0.7689 
(0.0517)*** 
0.9232 
(0.0271)*** 
0.9688 
(0.0212)*** 
LSP 
-0.0007 
(0.0011) 
0.0072 
(0.0024)*** 
-0.0030 
(0.0012)** 
-0.0047 
(0.0018)*** 
SSP 
0.0013 
(0.0014) 
-0.0040 
(0.0032) 
0.0017 
(0.0016) 
0.0067 
(0.0024)*** 
ER 
0.0005 
(0.0015) 
-0.0031 
(0.0033) 
0.0015 
(0.0017) 
0.0019 
(0.0024) 
PL 
-0.0013 
(0.0011) 
0.0001 
(0.0025) 
0.0003 
(0.0017) 
-0.0011 
(0.0019) 
TDF 
0.0029 
(0.001)*** 
0.0009 
(0.0023) 
0.0007 
(0.0011) 
0.0059 
(0.0016)*** 
COMPOL 
-0.0016 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0029) 
-0.0032 
(0.0015)** 
-0.0014 
(0.0022) 
BANKLIB 
0.0009 
(0.0013) 
0.0034 
(0.0029) 
0.0015 
(0.0014) 
-0.0006 
(0.0021) 
SECFIN 
-0.0009 
(0.0012) 
0.0012 
(0.0026) 
0.0019 
(0.0013) 
-0.0046 
(0.0019)** 
TELREF 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
0.0034 
(0.0020)* 
0.0015 
(0.0010) 
-0.0046 
(0.0015)*** 
ELECREF 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0023 
(0.0023) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
-0.0009 
(0.0016) 
ROADREF 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.0007 
(0.0029) 
-0.0005 
(0.0015) 
-0.0026 
(0.0021) 
WATEREF 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 
0.0009 
(0.0023) 
0.00005 
(0.0011) 
-0.0015 
(0.0016) 
R2 from 
LSDV
18
 
0.9947 0.9176 0.9914 0.9971 
P-value of 
year dummy 
joint test 
0.0000 0.0080 0.0001 0.0000 
Number of Observations = 375. Degrees of Freedom = 323.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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 Stata does not report R2 from the bias corrected LSDVc estimates. However, it does report the LSDV 
estimates in further detail and the two measures should be a reasonable approximation of one another. 
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Figure 6. Plots of year dummies for all regressions (2007 as the benchmark)
19
 
 
 
 
As the effects of reforms may vary across regions and degree of reform progress, the 
sample is divided into two groups: one for CIS participants and associates and another 
one for countries that do not participate in CIS (Table 5). Even if this approach divides 
the sample into two even smaller samples and makes it possible to find more specific 
effects of reforms in each of the blocks, it severely increases the dangers of LSDVC 
small sample biases as N is now below 15 for both cases. The size of the subsamples is 
considerably smaller than any of the samples considered by Bruno (2005). Therefore, 
these results must be treated with caution, and only as a complement to the main results 
above. Non-CIS group has 13 countries (208 observations) and CIS group has 12 
countries (192 observations) in this sample
20
. 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Note that a year dummy for the first year of the sample (1992) is not included due to the use of a 
dynamic model that cannot use the observations of the first year of data. 
20
 The CIS group also includes Ukraine (a founding state, but only associate since 1993), Turkmenistan 
(founding state, but only associate since 2005) and Georgia (founding state, left the CIS in 2009). 
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The estimated weights of the components from the Treelet transformation are estimated 
for the complete sample. The seven components that explain most of the variation are 
selected, with the optimal cut-level of the cluster tree selected accordingly. This 
represents an improvement in interpretation from classic Principal Component Analysis, 
as components are more sparse and do not present conflicting weights. The retrieved 
component weights are shown in Table 6. The regression results using the component 
weights are then presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 5. Results for Model (1) with CIS and non-CIS samples 
 HDI EI LEI GDP 
 NON CIS CIS NON CIS CIS NON CIS CIS NON CIS CIS 
Dep.Var (-1) 
0.9992 
(0.0366)*** 
0.8283 
(0.0470)*** 
0.8500 
(0.0593)*** 
0.5341 
(0.0723)*** 
0.9430 
(0.0538)*** 
0.9150 
(0.0342)*** 
0.9330 
(0.0302)*** 
0.9802 
(0.0285)*** 
LSP 
0.0021 
(0.0016) 
-0.0016 
(0.0017) 
0.0030 
(0.0039) 
0.0012 
(0.0041) 
-0.0008 
(0.0026) 
-0.0068 
(0.0015)*** 
0.0036 
(0.0020)* 
-0.0027 
(0.0024) 
SSP 
-0.0017 
(0.0018) 
0.0020 
(0.0022) 
0.0017 
(0.0048) 
-0.0032 
(0.0053) 
0.0017 
(0.0031) 
0.0015 
(0.0018) 
-0.0063 
(0.0023)*** 
0.0095 
(0.0031)*** 
ER 
0.0045 
(0.0018) 
-0.0014 
(0.0029) 
0.0048 
(0.0044) 
-0.0044 
(0.0071) 
0.0041 
(0.0029) 
0.0022 
(0.0025) 
0.0022 
(0.0023) 
-0.0027 
(0.0040) 
PL 0.0002 
(0.0020) 
-0.0004 
(0.0018) 
0.0020 
(0.0053) 
0.0040 
(0.0045) 
0.0004 
(0.0034) 
0.0005 
(0.0015) 
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
0.0009 
(0.0024) 
TDF 0.0022 
(0.0017) 
0.0035 
(0.0017) 
-0.0041 
(0.0043) 
0.0038 
(0.0041) 
0.0052 
(0.0029)* 
0.0010 
(0.0014) 
0.0045 
(0.0022)** 
0.0042 
(0.0023)* 
COMPOL -0.0034 
(0.0015)** 
0.0041 
(0.0025)* 
-0.0060 
(0.0039) 
0.0015 
(0.0061) 
-0.0029 
(0.0026) 
-0.0011 
(0.0021) 
-0.0005 
(0.0019) 
0.0039 
(0.0033) 
BANKLIB 0.0003 
(0.0017) 
0.0022 
(0.0027) 
-0.0010 
(0.0042) 
0.0062 
(0.0063) 
-0.0020 
(0.0027) 
0.0032 
(0.0021) 
0.0042 
(0.0021)** 
0.0002 
(0.0035) 
SECFIN -0.0003 
(0.0014) 
-0.0001 
(0.0023) 
-0.0014 
(0.0035) 
-0.0010 
(0.0058) 
-0.0010 
(0.0023) 
0.0069 
(0.0020)*** 
0.0026 
(0.0017) 
-0.0064 
(0.0032)** 
TELREF 0.0006 
(0.0009) 
-0.0001 
(0.0022) 
0.0025 
(0.0023) 
0.0060 
(0.0052) 
0.0008 
(0.0015) 
0.0031 
(0.0019)* 
-0.0018 
(0.0011) 
-0.0050 
(0.0030)* 
ELECREF 0.0018 
(0.0011)* 
-0.0030 
(0.0017)* 
-0.0007 
(0.0027) 
-0.0039 
(0.0041) 
0.0015 
(0.0017) 
-0.0004 
(0.0014) 
0.0035 
(0.0013)*** 
-0.0073 
(0.0022)*** 
ROADREF -0.0023 
(0.0014) 
0.0007 
(0.0022) 
-0.0032 
(0.0037) 
0.0048 
(0.0074) 
-0.0006 
(0.0024) 
-0.0015 
(0.0018) 
-0.0054 
(0.0018)*** 
0.0013 
(0.0029) 
WATEREF 0.0006 
(0.0010) 
-0.0011 
(0.0034) 
-0.0039 
(0.0027) 
0.0074 
(0.0083) 
0.0005 
(0.0018) 
-0.0016 
(0.0028) 
0.0034 
(0.0014)** 
0.0001 
(0.0046) 
R2 from 
LSDV 0.9956 
 
0.9872 0.9668 
 
0.7977 0.9876 
 
0.9895 0.9977 
 
0.9954 
P-value of 
year dummy 
joint test 
0.0000 
 
 
0.3213 0.0001 
 
 
0.9836 0.0081 
 
 
0.2686 0.3252 
 
 
0.0000 
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 C1 is a component with a broad mix of policies, based mostly on infrastructure 
(excl. electricity and roads), banking and enterprise restructuring. This is an 
“overall reform package” and does not include market opening or privatization, 
but only significant advances in how the banking, governance processes and 
infrastructure and utilities are managed. This represents an economic reform 
without market opening and attracting private/foreign investors. 
 
 C2 is a mix of trade and foreign exchange reforms and small scale privatization 
policies. This is an “early reform variable”, as these two reforms were usually 
early steps in reform efforts in transition economies, and are associated with 
market opening and attracting private sector initiative to the economy. 
 
 C3 to C7 consist entirely of one variable each, large scale privatization, road 
infrastructure reforms, trade and foreign exchange systems and competitive 
policy measures respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Components weights from Treelet transformation 
Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
LSP    1    
SSP  0.71      
ER 0.46       
PL   1     
TDF  0.71      
COMPOL       1 
BANKLIB 0.46       
SECFIN 0.44       
TELREF 0.44       
ELECREF      1  
ROADREF     1   
WATEREF 0.44       
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Table 7: Regression results from the component weights (Model 2) 
  HDI EI LEI GDP 
Dep.Var (-1) 
0.9439 0.7761 0.9255 0.9622 
(0.0265)*** (0.0476)*** (0.026)*** (0.020)*** 
C1 
-0.0003 0.0029 0.0023 -0.004 
(0.0007) (0.0017)* (0.0008)*** (0.0011)*** 
C2 
0.0037 -0.002 0.0019 0.0098 
(0.0008)*** (0.0018) (0.0009)** (0.0013)*** 
C3 
-0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004 
(0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0011) 
C4 
-0.0007 0.0061 -0.0028 -0.0038 
(0.0009) (0.0022)*** (0.0011)** (0.0016)** 
C5 
-0.0005 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0023 
(0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0015) 
C6 
-0.0005 -0.0019 0.0007 -0.001 
(0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0014) 
C7 
-0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.001 
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0009)** (0.0013) 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
 
There is no change in results when compared to Table 4 in terms of significance with 
regards to components with a single variable. This implies that multicolinearity does not 
appear to affect the results
21
. We test for interaction between the components by adding 
multiplicative terms. Thus, we avoid using the original EBRD indices due to the 
“dimensionality curse” and multicolinearity as the significance test has low power for 
that. When such terms are included, inference on lower-order coefficients becomes 
irrelevant and only inference on the multiplicative term is legitimate (Braumoeller, 
2004). Staehr (2005) states that the significance tests of the multiplicative terms have 
low powers, especially when variables exhibit low variations (as in the EBRD indices).  
 
We consider a set of possible interactions: the interaction of C1/C2, C1/4, C2/C4 and 
C4/C7, to assess the impacts of interactions between the most important economic 
reform packages and their relationship to large scale privatizations and finally, the 
interaction of privatizations with governance reforms in the context of disorderly 
                                                          
21 One of the effects of multicolinearity is that the standard errors might be too high, leading to the lack of 
significance of variables that are significant. 
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privatization process). This provides us with additional information related to the 
hypothesis outlined previously. 
 
The interaction terms C1/C6 and C2/C6 are also considered in order to assess the 
importance of the macroeconomic reforms to trigger effects of electricity reforms. This 
inclusion is motivated by the findings in Nepal and Jamasb (2014) that implementing 
reforms is not the same as delivering results in the context of transition countries. The 
inclusion of these terms is to reflect the importance of the energy sector in transition and 
the changes it went through, in terms of efficiency and pricing. Table7 shows the signs 
and significance of interaction terms for each regression. 
 
The results from the interaction terms add explanatory power to our analysis, 
particularly to the GDP and EI regressions as shown in Table 8. The effects on the 
aggregated HDI itself are less clear. It should be noted that the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) after the inclusion of such terms increases sharply and the inclusion of more 
interaction terms would eventually bring back the problems associated with 
multicolinearity. This justifies the limited number of interaction terms that were chosen 
with a view to the research questions in discussion. 
 
Table 8: The results of selected reform interactions (Model 3) 
 
HDI GDP LEI EI 
C1*C2 - -  (***) + + 
C1*C4 + + (***) + - (**) 
C2*C4 + - (***) + + (***) 
C4*C7 - (**) - - - 
C1*C6 - - - (***) + (**) 
C2*C6 + + (**) + - 
P-value of F-test 
(joint significance 
of interaction terms) 
0.3565 0.0004 0.0175 0.0055 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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7. Discussion of results 
A first result that emerges from our analysis is that the impact of reforms on the HDI is 
not uniform and varies across different dimensions of human development. Specific 
reforms cause impacts in different dimensions and not always with an expected positive 
outcome. Although there is no explicit way to test for Hypothesis 1 in this context, 
many reforms appear to be insignificant, as the HDI appears to be positively influenced 
by reforms. In component analysis, only the component referring to “early market 
opening” is positively significant. Hence, hypothesis 1 is not confirmed, in the sense 
that specific reforms matter. The interaction of the two largest sets of reforms 
(Components 1 and 2) even had negative effects in GDP. Banking and governance 
reforms without market opening do not seem to make a positive impact. 
 
Regarding infrastructural reforms, only the telecommunication reforms seem to produce 
any effects. In fact, increases in EBRD indexes of infrastructure can be caused by 
increases in prices that are closer to efficient levels. This makes it impossible to 
consistently support Hypothesis 2. This can occur because the standards of electricity 
and water supply were already reasonable and the reform measure used ultimately 
implies that reforms will mostly lead to higher prices. The increase in prices can 
increase the share of household income spent on them to very high levels, which can 
explain the negative significance of the interaction term between electricity reforms and 
the reform package without sale of state assets in health outcomes. The disaggregated 
sample also points out for a positive effect of power sector reform in non-CIS GDP and 
a negative effect in GDP in CIS countries – this can relate to the fact that the share of 
income spent on utility bills in CIS countries is larger than the one in Eastern Europe 
countries as prices go up in both regions. 
 
The consistently low levels of competition policy reforms can keep a power sector 
reform from producing positive effects since market reforms bring extra responsibility 
to the competition authorities (Pollitt, 2009). This argument can be extended to the 
telecommunications sector. Another explanation for the lack of evidence for positive 
effect of infrastructure can be the inverted threshold argument, i.e. it is possible that 
changes in infrastructure play a crucial role when its starting levels are very low (i.e. 
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there are still parts of the population with no electricity, water or roads). In the case of 
the Soviet Union basic infrastructures were available to the population. 
 
The impact of large-scale privatizations under Hypothesis 3 also seems to be supported 
by results where reforms generated a negative impact on the life expectancy index. 
According to disaggregated results, this negative effect might stem mostly from CIS 
countries. The negative impact of competition policy reforms on the life expectancy 
index is a striking result, but not confirmed by disaggregated results. Components 1 and 
2 are also positively related to health expectancy, implying that both policies of market 
opening and banking/infrastructure reforms produce positive results. Reform 
interactions do not seem to be as important for health outcomes as is the case for other 
human development dimensions. 
 
The “dirty privatization” argument of Black et al. (2000) finds support in the data 
(Hypothesis 4), as large scale privatizations negatively affect GDP, although small scale 
privatizations appear to have a positive effect. In separate CIS and non-CIS samples 
results tend to point that large scale privatizations are beneficial for non-CIS economies 
and small scale privatizations are beneficial for CIS economies, which might link to the 
lack of complementary reforms in CIS countries or the stage of the reform process. 
Governance indexes are low across the sample and the interaction term between large 
scale privatizations and competition policy is not significant for GDP, meaning that 
higher levels of the competition policy index are not triggering improved results in 
privatization efforts. 
 
The impact of reforms on education is mostly related to large scale privatization and 
telecommunication reforms. Our composite analysis also points that component C1 (a 
broader reform effort) can have a positive effect, even if only at a 10% significance 
level. In that sense, Hypothesis 5 finds limited evidence that some reforms positively 
influenced educational outcomes, by creating incentives, reducing communication and 
knowledge barriers and possibly giving better access to funding. Some specific 
interactions of reforms appear to be positive, such as a mix of sale of state assets and 
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trade/exchange rate reforms. This evidence is limited further by the lack of any 
significant effect in separated CIS and non-CIS samples.  
 
Besides the testing of our hypothesis, further comments can be made. The complexity of 
the effects and the possibility of a specific reform having different impacts across 
different dimensions are largely confirmed, justifying a component-specific analysis as 
well as the analysis to the impacts on the composite HDI. While many reforms and 
policy packages are significant across individual development dimensions, the 
combination of such dimensions as a representation of human capabilities shows that 
opening the market was a crucial factor for success. 
 
As a final note, the results reject that the HDI is only a measurement of the GDP in a 
complex and richer framework. We find a correlation of 96% between the HDI and the 
GDP Index in this sample. However, the diversity of impacts and results that mostly 
follow economic theory show that, as the UNDP points out, GDP is not everything. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to explore the significance of market-related institutional and 
infrastructure reforms in economic and social changes of human well-being, as 
measured by the composite Human Development Index and its constituents. While GDP 
and growth regression analysis has been extensive, the main contribution of this work is 
the extension of such analysis to health and education, considering Sen’s (1989) 
capabilities approach as the end of analysis, instead of a classic growth analysis.  
 
We use the LSDVC technique, which is appropriate in this context, while trying to 
tackle a large set of problems in the data and gain insight into reform complementarity. 
While the HDI construction implies some arbitrary weightings, it reveals important 
information about the changes that the transition economies moved towards market 
economy. We find that the reform process in transition economies has sparked a diverse 
set of impacts across different dimensions of human development, as the countries went 
through quick and drastic changes. The most important result is that although, in 
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general, reforms generated positive impacts, policy matters and policy packages are 
important. The negative impact of mass privatizations is an important.  
 
The impact of infrastructure is generally unclear as no strong evidence could be found 
in that sense. A possible “threshold” where reforms start generating strong effects is 
worth analysing, since the areas of reform where countries are closer to a market 
economy are the ones that appear to generate important impacts. The role of governance 
is not clarified in our results, which is a paradigm in need of an answer in future 
research. Results also point that sometimes higher levels of reform indexes do not 
directly lead to improved outcomes for human development dimensions. 
 
As research in this field is very limited, other expansions are easy to number and there 
remains a significant future work that can be done. For example, some extensions 
include creating indexes that include more information such as child mortality and the 
spread of diseases in the Health Index. Similarly, the inclusion of inequality considering 
opportunities in access to education and health besides an income inequality analysis 
can be incorporated in the analysis. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1: Multicolinearity Tests 
Variable VIF 
LSP 5.42 
SSP 4.75 
ER 7.46 
PL 3.24 
TDF 5.40 
COMPOL 3.67 
BANKLIB 8.80 
SECFIN 4.93 
ELECREF 4.16 
WATEREF 4.50 
ROADREF 3.29 
TELREF 3.89 
Mean VIF: 5.04 
Condition Index: 48.89 
Notes: Condition Index retrieved through “coldiag2” command on STATA.  
All other information retrieved through command “collin”. 
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A.2: Methodology of the Human Development Index  
(According to the 1999 Human Development Report) 
 
𝐻𝐷𝐼 =
(𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)
3
 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
= (2 ∗ (𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) +  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 
𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
100
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
100
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
log(𝐺𝐷𝑃) − 100
40000 − 100
 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ − 25
85 − 25
 
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1999_en_technote.pdf 
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A.3.: Cross-section dependence CD test 
 
Model (1) 
Dependent Variable Test Score P-Value 
HDI -2.29 0.022 
GDP -2.35 0.019 
LEI 2.49 0.013 
EI -1.92 0.054 
 
 
Model (2) 
Dependent Variable Test Score P-Value 
HDI -2.21 0.027 
GDP -2.40 0.016 
LEI 2.45 0.014 
EI -1.89 0.059 
 
 
Model (3) 
Dependent Variable Test Score P-Value 
HDI -2.16 0.031 
GDP -2.27 0.023 
LEI 0.57 0.572 
EI -1.84 0.065 
 
